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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE EFFECTS OF DEFENDANT ACCOUNT
ON DAMAGE AWARD DECISIONS
by
Tracey Renee Carpenter
Florida International University, 2001
Miami, Florida
Professor Margaret Bull Kovera, Major Professor

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the manner in which civil defendants
account for their behavior influences compensatory and punitive damage awards. Jurors
read three civil trial summaries, in which I manipulated injury severity (high vs. low),
defendant reprehensibility (high vs. low), defendant status (individual vs. corporate), and
account (concession, excuse, justification or refusal) in a factorial design. I also included
four control groups in which the defendant stipulated liability. In all other conditions,
participants read that a jury had found the defendant negligent. Only defendant
reprehensibility influenced punitive awards. Both plaintiff injury and defendant
reprehensibility influenced compensatory awards.

When individuals offered

justifications and when corporations offered excuses, jurors awarded lower compensatory
awards against low reprehensibility defendants than against high reprehensibility
defendants. Negligence stipulations led to lower damage awards for individuals than for
corporations. Additionally, concessions tended to produce lower awards when combined

V

with a stipulation of negligence as opposed to a jury decision. These findings support the
hypothesis that in cases in which the defendant is clearly negligent, circumstances exist in
which stipulating negligence and offering an apologetic account will lead to reduced
damage awards decisions. Results indicate that individual and corporate defendants
offering justifications and refusals should first consider the reprehensibility of their
actions. In a broader realm, findings demonstrate that the manner in which a jury
perceives the explanation given by the defendant is dependent upon defendant
characteristics and case-specific factors.
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Introduction

In 1995, a civil suit was brought against Dow Chemical Corporation asserting that
the breast implants manufactured by the company caused disease (Dow Chemical v.
Mahlum, 1998). Dow Chemical was accused of selling a dangerous product, having
knowledge of the product's danger, and misrepresenting that danger to the public. The
corporation accepted full responsibility for the product they manufactured and apologized
for the suffering of persons who received their product, but denied that their product
caused disease. Dow Chemical's director of public issues management responded, "We
are concerned about anybody who is suffering from ill health, no matter what the cause.
Aside from that compassion...allegations that Dow Chemical in any way acted
improperly, or in any way harmed Mrs. Mahlum, are simply not true" ("Breast Implant
Lawsuit", 1995). The Dow Chemical Corporation lost the case and was instructed to pay
$3.9 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. Many
similar cases followed and resulted in similar responses.
The Philip Morris Company and Firestone Tires have faced accusations about the
harmfulness and addictiveness of cigarettes and a design defect in specific tire types,
respectively (Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 1998; Rodriguez v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc 2001). Both lawsuits accused the companies of being aware that their products were
dangerous and failing to take corrective action or warn consumers of that danger. In
addition, the companies were charged with misleading the public as to the safety of their
products. Although these two cases are quite different, the companies responded in very
similar manners. Both companies apologized for harm suffered, but adamantly denied
full responsibility for the charges against them. Phillip Morris and Firestone have
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released statements denying any wrongdoing and claiming that at no time did they
endanger the health or safety of the public by withholding information from consumers.
Phillip Morris stated that "they made cigarettes as safe as the market would bear" and
"deny they fixed nicotine levels to maximize addictiveness". They also argue "their
customers understood and accepted the risks of smoking."("Jury Picked", 1998).
Firestone claimed, "We take responsibility for our tires and our tires were part of the
issue", but a tread separation should be merely an inconvenience, not a catastrophe. "We
must look at the vehicle," rather than focus solely on the tire (Rodriguez v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 2001). Both companies' responses indicate that the blame
for the incidents in question actually lies elsewhere.
These three cases are examples of civil lawsuits that attracted massive media
attention. In each case a company was accused of wrongdoing that adversely affected
other people. Once such accusations are made, the companies are forced to respond to
the accusations. The companies may choose to accept responsibility and offer some type
of explanation for their behavior or they may choose to deny any wrongdoing.

Each of

these three companies, accepted responsibility for their product, apologized for the harm
suffered, but argued that their product was not bad. Dow Chemical Company denied that
they had done anything wrong. Phillip Morris and Bridgestone/Firestone attempted to
redefine the situation to place the blame somewhere other than on their company.
Considering that several companies choose this defense approach in high profile cases,
several interesting questions arise. How are such denials and justifications in these cases
perceived? Are these denials or justifications beneficial to the companies? Would the
companies be better served by admitting the wrongdoing and offering the public an
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apology? Would the public be more accepting of such mistakes if the companies
accepted responsibility for their actions?
The purpose of civil lawsuits is to hold persons accountable for behavior that
negatively influences the lives of others. One individual or company sues another
individual or company for some harm, loss, or damage suffered. The plaintiffs, or injured
parties, initiate a lawsuit based on the idea that another party is responsible for their
suffering. The defendants are accused of either directly causing the injury to the
plaintiffs or negligently failing to prevent the injury. In such cases, the plaintiff requests
monetary damages from the defendant as compensation for the loss or harm suffered.
In response to plaintiff's claims, defendants are essentially asked to explain their
behavior. Did they act in the manner stated by the plaintiff? If so, why? Should they
have been expected to foresee the harm done? Much research has been done to examine
how persons explain negative or hurtful behavior. Multiple studies have shown how
different explanations are perceived and what types of explanations are most believable
and effective. However, this research has dealt primarily with interpersonal relationships.
Given that the primary task of civil defendants is to explain their behavior in a way that
will portray them in the most favorable light, it is logical to assume that such research
could benefit participants in civil litigation. This study focused on how differing defense
explanations may influence decision-making in legal contexts.

EXPLANATIONS FOR WRONGDOING
Whether in a work, school, or social setting, most persons are required to account
for their behavior on a regular basis. Given the frequency with which each person's
behavior influences others, it is inevitable that some behaviors will not meet expectations
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or will cause another person to experience inconvenience, discomfort, or harm. There is
a natural tendency to try to explain such shortcomings in an attempt to preserve or
maintain a positive reputation in the eyes of another (Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen,
1992).
There are several responses that one may give to an allegation of wrongdoing.
Responses in such situations are known in the psychological literature as accounts.
Schoenbach's (1980) account taxonomy defines four common types of accounts:
concessions, excuses, justifications and refusals. In concessions, the wrongdoer admits
the act occurred, accepts responsibility, and offers an apology. An excuse consists of not
only an acceptance that one played a part in causing the act but also a reason why he/she
should not be held fully responsible for the act. Justifications are offered when accused
persons admit their involvement in the incident but attempt to explain the situation in a
manner that portrays them in a more positive light. In essence, the accused tries to
redefine the situation to look less blameworthy. A refusal is an outright denial of the
situation or denial of any wrongdoing in the situation.
For example, after arriving late for an appointment, a colleague may explain his
behavior in one of four ways. He may simply apologize for being late, admit that he was
at fault, and offer to reschedule the appointment (concession). He may, instead,
apologize for being late, but blame his tardiness on circumstances outside of his control,
such as traffic (excuse). His third option is to attempt to make his tardiness not seem so
bad. For example, he may say that he is sorry if his colleague had been waiting long, but
then continue by commenting that he did not think the appointment time was set in stone
(justification). Finally, he may simply deny being late (refusal).
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Use of the four account types can be seen in legal settings as well. Using a civil
dispute concerning a car accident as an example, it is possible to see how each type of
account could be considered when choosing a defense. Given a case in which the
plaintiff sues the defendant for running a red light and causing an accident, the defendant
may choose to explain the negligent behavior in several ways. A concession in this
circumstance would consist of the defendant admitting to running the red light and
causing the accident, and offering the plaintiff an apology. Another choice would be for
the defendant to admit to partial causation for the accident and to offer an apology, but to
blame the accident on weather conditions, faulty brakes, or some other circumstance
beyond his control (excuse). The defendant, as a third option, could argue that although
he is sorry for the plaintiffs injuries, but that the light was still yellow when he entered
the intersection. Such a redefining of the situation constitutes a justification. Probably
the most common explanation in this context is the refusal. A refusal would consist of
the defendant arguing that the light was green, the accident was not his/her fault, and
he/she did nothing wrong. Justifications and refusals are the strategies used by the three
companies discussed previously.
As illustrated by this example, a civil defendant has several options when
deciding how to explain the behavior in question. Realizing that there are several
accounts available for use, the defense then must decide which account is most beneficial
to their case. In cases in which liability is not clear, justifications and refusals may
indeed lead to the lowest damage award decisions. However, in situations in which there
is high evidence and liability is clear, would damages then be lower if the defense
accepted responsibility and offered their apologies? Do certain accounts cause the jury to
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perceive the defense more favorably? If so, which accounts are most beneficial? Does
the preferred type of account change depending on the specific facts of the case, such as
injury severity or defendant reprehensibility? Does stipulating negligence or admitting
liability reduce damage award amounts? What factors are usually considered when
making decisions concerning the type of account to use or whether to stipulate
negligence? What factors should be considered when making such decisions?
In a civil dispute, the deciding factor as to which account a defendant chooses to
use is most likely how jurors will view each possible account. The goal of each side is to
choose the account that jurors are more likely to relate to and believe. Jurors' perceptions
of the defendant's account are instrumental to any decisions made in the case. These
perceptions may determine which party will be believed, how liability will be
determined, whether damages should be awarded, and if so, the amount of damages to
award. The focus of the present investigation is to examine the influence of accounts on
jurors' damage awards.
Perceptions of Accounts
Researchers have investigated how people perceive different accounts by
manipulating the type of account that is given following an offensive act and measuring
participant reactions to that account. In one study, participants read scenarios of a
politician engaging in unbecoming behavior, either on-the-job or during his private time
(Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983). The scenarios included either an excuse or a
justification to explain the behavior. The politician was held more responsible and the
act was seen as more wrong when the offensive behavior was conducted on-the-job than
when it was conducted during his private time. Explaining his behavior through
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justifications as opposed to excuses also led the participants to view the politician as
more likely to engage in similar acts in the future. However, when the politician offered
a justification for his behavior as opposed to an excuse, the perceived wrongfulness of the
act was diminished. Therefore, excuses proved more beneficial in reducing the
politician's responsibility for his behavior and in preserving his character. On the other
hand, justifications were more effective in making the act seem less wrong.
Riordan, Marlin, and Gidwani (1988) propose that if the accounts are believed,
then different types of accounts should lead to different results. The purpose of excuses
has been defined as the attempt to convince others that one's negative actions are due less
to inherent personal characteristics and more to situational or environmental
characteristics (Snyder & Higgins, 1988). According to the fundamental attribution error,
observers tend to blame an actor's undesirable behavior on internal characteristics of the
actor, rather than characteristics of the situation. Excuse-giving, therefore, is an attempt
to convince the observer that the behavior was more dependent on the situation than
would be otherwise assumed. If the excuse is effective in accomplishing this goal, then
the actor's character or image should increase when the excuse is given.
Excuses, which deny any intent for wrongdoing, should result in a reduction in
perceived need for punishment. This should be the case because accidents or
unintentional acts are not generally punished. Justifications, on the other hand, attempt to
redefine the situation so that it appears less negative. If a justification is believed, the
result should be a more positive view of the situation, rather than a lessened need for
punishment. Therefore, excuses should result in a less negative perception of the actor
and justifications should result in a less negative view of the situation.
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Findings from a role-playing study did not support these hypotheses (Riordan, et
al., 1988). In this study, psychologists read scenarios concerning unethical research

practices. The researcher in the scenario was guilty of either plagiarism or data
fabrication. After reading the researcher's account for his actions, the psychologists gave
their opinions of the researcher, the researcher's work and actions, and the type of
consequences they felt were appropriate. In contrast to what was expected by the
researchers, the lowest level of perceived wrongfulness of the act was found when
researchers accounted for the act with a denial. Excuses followed denials with
justifications producing the highest level of perceived wrongfulness. The same trend was
demonstrated when examining the researcher's decency, respectability, and goodness.
For each of these three factors, researchers who offered denials were viewed more
positively than those who offered justifications or excuses. In addition, researchers
offering excuses were seen as less likely to commit such an act again and less likely to
have their work discredited. Unexpectedly, the type of account given did not influence
the psychologist's opinion of the proper consequences for the act.
Justifications have also been found to be the least helpful account type for the
offender in research using traffic court scenarios. Participants read descriptions of
incidents and accounts given in response to those incidents. They then rated the
offender's moral responsibility, the offender's degree of blame, the influence of the
offender's personality, and the offender's intent to break the law. Offender's intent to
break the law and the influence of personal characteristics of the offender were seen as
highest in situations in which offenders accounted for their behavior using justifications.
In other words, offenders were held to the highest degree of personal responsibility for
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the occurrence when they attempted to justify their behavior (McLaughlin, Cody, &

French, 1990).
Contrary to other research, justifications received high ratings in a study designed
to examine what factors influenced perceived outcome fairness in negotiation situations
(Conlon & Ross, 1997). The authors developed a negotiation scenario with different
outcome possibilities in which a third party intervened and imposed a specific outcome.
One of the manipulated factors was the type of account given by the third party for the
imposed outcome. Concessions, justifications, and excuses were compared. Somewhat
surprisingly, participant perceptions were found to be most positive when justifications
were given. The imposed outcome was seen as fairer and more satisfactory when the
third party explained his actions using a justification, rather than a concession or an
excuse.

To be effective, an account must be plausible, consistent, and believable. In the
same manner that certain accounts are perceived as more appropriate and acceptable,
some accounts are also more effective in achieving specific goals. By manipulating the
type of account offered across scenarios, researchers have examined which account types
tend to be more effective (Benoit & Drew, 1997). Across five scenarios, participants
rated how appropriate the account response seemed and how effective they felt the
account would be. Although the authors developed their own account typology, their
results were consistent with previous findings. The highest effectiveness ratings were
given in conditions in which offenders apologized and conditions in which the offender
offered to take corrective action. Denials produced the lowest effectiveness ratings.
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When accounting for behavior, the goal is often forgiveness or excuse of the
behavior. One researcher examined the type of account most conducive to that goal by
having participants report to the laboratory and complete a questionnaire packet

(Gonzales, 1992). Once the packet was completed, a researcher led the participants to
believe that they had been given the wrong packet and that their responses were useless.
The researchers then accounted for their actions using a concession, an excuse, or a
refusal. Participants were then questioned by another researcher and asked to rate their

research experience and the initial researcher. Ratings for the account-givers were more
positive when the mistake was explained using a concession or excuse, rather than a
refusal. In addition, participants in the concession or excuse conditions reported a greater
likelihood that they would return in the future to redo the experiment than did participants
in the refusal conditions.
In one of the few studies concerning accounts within the legal system, account
effectiveness was determined by length of prison sentences. Felson & Ribner (1981)
examined the accounts proffered by New York State inmates convicted of murder,
manslaughter, or felony assault and the sentences the inmates received. In cases of
murder and first degree assault, the longest sentences were given in situations in which
the offender denied his actions. This study indicates that the admission of wrongful acts
resulted in greater leniency. However, there are many outside factors that suggest that
these results must be interpreted with caution. First, the authors used written accounts by
the inmates that were provided after, rather than before, the sentencing. It is possible to
imagine that a percentage of the inmates may have altered their accounts following their
sentencing. Furthermore, there are many aspects of violent crimes other than account type
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that may affect sentencing. Factors such as past record, degree of violence, and
intentionality of the act may all exert a much greater influence on sentencing than the
type of account given by the inmate. Experimental studies that controlled for such

additional factors are needed in order to determine whether higher sanctions are actually
imposed against defendants who offer denials rather than admissions of their guilt.
Another naturalistic study conducted within the legal system investigated the
types of accounts offered in actual traffic court cases and the resulting fines levied against
the offenders (Cody & McLaughlin, 1988). Observers recorded the particulars of each
case, the account offered by the offender, and the judge's punishment decision.
Punishments were categorized as no fine, partial fine, or full fine. Denials accompanied
by proof of innocence resulted in the greatest number of 'no fine' penalties. Partial fines,
or fine reductions, tended to occur in cases in which offenders offered a concrete, rather
than vague explanation for their behavior. Denials with no proof were less effective, and
full fines were most likely when the offender offered concessionary accounts. Judges did
not reduce fines because offenders accepted responsibility and offered apologies.
Offense Severity
Different accounts indeed do lead to different perceptions. Does the severity of
the offense influence the manner in which the accounts are perceived? An examination of
offense severity and account type found that participants were more likely to believe
accounts in situations in which the behavior was less severe (Blumstein, Carssow, Hall,
Hawkins, Hoffman, Ishem, Maurer, Spens, Taylor, and Zimmerman, 1974). Another
study examined account-giving strategies within intimate relationships by incorporating
not only the type of account offered by the offender, but the severity of the offense
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(Hupka, Jung, & Silverthorn, 1987). In low severity conditions, the offending partner
flirted with someone outside of the relationship. In high severity conditions, the
offending partner had sexual intercourse with someone outside the relationship.
Apologies and excuses were perceived as more effective when the severity was low
rather than high. Offended parties rated justifications similarly regardless of severity
condition.
The authors also manipulated whether the offender intended to maintain or end
the relationship. If the offender's goal was to maintain the relationship, apologies and
excuses were expected to be the most beneficial accounts. The authors based this
prediction on the fact that both apologies and excuses take the offended party's face
needs into consideration, which is important if the relationship is to continue.
Justifications, on the other hand, are an attempt to bolster the offender's self-image at the
expense of the offended party. For this reason, justifications were expected to be more
beneficial accounts in situations in which the offender wished to end rather than maintain
the relationship. Data revealed that apologies were perceived as the best accounts. This
held true both when offenders intended to maintain and when they intended to end the
relationship. As predicted, justifications received the lowest ratings of the account types
when the offender wanted to maintain the relationship. However, when offenders desired
to end the relationship, justifications fared better than excuses.
Offender Blameworthiness
One factor that may influence how accounts are perceived is the degree of
offender blameworthiness. Researchers manipulated both blameworthiness and account
type within a single study (Gonzales, Haugen, & Manning, 1994). Participants read
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scenarios and assumed the role of the offended party within each scenario.
Blameworthiness was manipulated by describing the offensive act as accidental,
negligent, or intentional. Participant's reactions to the accounts did not differ in content.
Estimated consequences and ratings of the given explanations were similar across

account conditions. However, there were significant differences in the tones used in
responding. More negative and sarcastic responses were given in the more blameworthy
conditions. When the acts were intentional, account type did not alter participants'
perceptions of the event. For accidental and negligent acts, account perceptions differed
by gender. In accidental conditions, men tended to prefer concessions and excuses rather
than justifications and refusals. Women demonstrated no account preference. The
opposite gender trend was true for negligent offenses. Women tended to prefer
concessions over other accounts and men did not demonstrate an account preference.
Offender characteristics
Offender characteristics and the delivery of the account also influence whether an
account is honored or accepted once it has been given. Participants read a scenario
involving the commission of an offense and how the offender accounted for the offense
(Blumstein et al., 1974). The participants then evaluated the individuals in the scenario,
the action, and the account. They then predicted how likely it was that the account would
be accepted. The authors manipulated both the account type and the status of the
individuals in the scenario. The status manipulation consisted of three conditions: the
offending party of higher status than the offended party, both parties of equal status, and
the offended party of higher status than the offending party. When the offender was of a
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higher status than the person offended, participants judged that accounts proffered were
more likely to be believed than those offered by persons of an equal or lesser status.
Another factor that influenced the predicted acceptance of the given account was
the offender's moral worth. Participants predicted that the accounts of offenders who

they viewed as trustworthy, sincere, valuable, and responsible were likely to be believed.
The likelihood that the act would be repeated and the degree of repentance also
influenced the predicted acceptance of the account. Offenders that were deemed most
likely to be believed were the offenders that appeared properly repentant and less likely
to commit the same act again. Although these authors did not categorize the accounts
based on Schoenbach's taxonomy, the accounts that were accepted were consistent with
concessions and excuses.
The aforementioned research demonstrates that many factors influence how
explanations for wrongdoing are perceived, and whether the explanation furthers the
accounter's achievement of a particular goal. In the context of a civil dispute, this
research highlights many interesting questions that have yet to be examined. The manner
in which defendants account for their behavior could potentially influence the trial
outcome in different ways. Jurors in civil cases must make several decisions. Initially,
jurors must decide if the defendant was negligent and did indeed cause the harm or loss
suffered by the plaintiff. If the defendant is found liable, then the jury must decide what
amount of money, or damages, should be awarded to the plaintiff in order to make up for
what he/she has suffered.
The current legal system allows damages to be awarded in two forms. The two
forms of damages differ as to the purpose they are intended to serve. The first type of
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damages, compensatory damages, is meant to compensate the plaintiff for any suffered
losses. The purpose of this type of award is to reinstate the plaintiff to the position in
which he/she was prior to the incident in question. These damages are specified to cover
losses such as medical expenses, loss of wages or support, and pain and suffering. The
second type of damages, punitive damages, is meant to punish the defendant or teach the

defendant a lesson for his/her poor conduct. This type of damages is intended to serve as
punishment for wantonly negligent or reckless behavior and to deter such conduct in the
future. Punitive damages are also meant to demonstrate to other persons or companies
that such negligent behavior will not be tolerated.

Oftentimes in civil disputes, the argument does not lie in whether there was
negligence on the part of the defendant. The question of liability is often quite clear. In
fact, in many instances the facts of the case strongly demonstrate that the defendant was
indeed negligent. The real argument between the parties concerns the amount of

damages deserved by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence. As would be
expected, the plaintiff generally asks for an amount that is much higher than the
defendant deems fair or appropriate. In such cases, a question arises. Would it be
beneficial to the defendant to stipulate negligence? Would an admission of fault win
points with the jury and result in smaller damage awards? Jurors may be more
sympathetic toward defendants who accepted responsibility and apologized for their
actions. These kinder feelings toward the defendant might result in lower damage
awards.
In particular, punitive damage awards, in which the purpose of the damages is to
punish the defendant for his negligent behavior, may be especially sensitive to such a
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change. Jurors may be less likely to feel the need to punish an already apologetic
defendant as opposed to a defendant who continually denies any wrongdoing. This study
examines how defendant's accounts may affect both compensatory and punitive damage

awards, specifically in situations where liability is clear.
FACTORS AFFECTING DAMAGE AWARDS
Various factors have been shown to affect civil damage awards. Given the
distinct purposes of the two types of damage awards, different factors should be
considered when deciding compensatory awards than when deciding punitive awards.
Compensatory awards are meant to return to plaintiff to his or her prior state and as such,
should be based solely on damages suffered by the plaintiff. Punitive awards, designed to
punish and deter, should be based on characteristics of the defendant. The defendant's
conduct and assets may be considered in order to determine an amount suitable to fulfill

the punitive damage goals. However, in practice, it is apparently difficult for jurors to
compartmentalize the types of damages in such a manner. Defendant's conduct and
assets have been shown to affect not only punitive damage awards, but also
compensatory damage awards (Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996; Carpenter, Kovera, &
Moran, 2000). The majority of research concerning factors that influence damage award
decisions has focused on three factors: the severity of the plaintiff's injury; the degree of
the defendant's blameworthiness, and the defendant's status as an individual or
corporation.
Injury Severity
The degree of a plaintiff's injury often influences the amount of award presented
to the plaintiff (Bovbjerg, Sloan, Dor, & Hsieh, 1991; Cather et al., 1996). When
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considering compensatory damages, these findings are not only logical but in accordance
with the law. Compensatory damages were designed to compensate plaintiffs for their
injuries, and as such, should increase as the severity of the injury increases. Research has
shown that this indeed occurs. An examination of damage awards in malpractice cases
demonstrated that compensatory damages are positively correlated with injury severity

(Bovbjerb, et al, 1991). The highest compensatory damages were awarded to the
plaintiffs with the most severe injuries. Likewise, the lowest compensatory damages
were awarded to the plaintiffs with the least severe injuries.

Compensatory damages are generally divided into several categories, including
medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. One type of compensatory
damage, pain and suffering, tends to be especially sensitive to variations in injury

severity. Jurors are provided with explicit information as to medical expenses, previous
salary of the plaintiff, and the amount of time that the plaintiff will be unable to work.
Based on the information they are given, jurors can make directed decisions about how to

compensate the plaintiffs for their medical bills and lost wages. When deciding pain and
suffering awards, however, jurors are not provided with such direction. Placing a
monetary value on the abstract notion of pain and suffering may be understandably
difficult for jurors. In addition, this category offers jurors more leeway in their decisionmaking and as a result is more open to the influence of outside factors. Pain and
suffering awards are strongly influenced by the severity of injury to the plaintiff. As one
would logically predict, jurors awarded higher pain and suffering awards to plaintiffs
who endured the most severe injuries (Wissler, Evens, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997).
These findings are both understandable and legally sound.
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Findings from research examining whether injury severity improperly influences
punitive award decisions have been mixed. Relationships have been demonstrated
between injury severity and punitive awards. In one study, severely injured plaintiffs

received higher punitive awards than mildly injured plaintiffs; punitive damages tended
to be awarded only in cases in which the plaintiff suffered a severe injury (Koenig &
Rustad, 1993). In another study, researchers found only marginally significant effects
for injury severity on compensatory awards, and no significant effects for injury severity
on punitive awards (Cather, et al., 1996).
The influence of injury severity on damage awards is well established. This study

will examine the interplay between account type and injury severity and address several
unanswered questions. Will the influence of injury severity on damage awards be
moderated by account type? Will differences in accounts only demonstrate effects on
awards when injury severity is low? The literature on accounts indicates that accounts

are most effective in situations where the offense is less severe (Blumstein et al., 1974;
Hupka et al., 1987). For this reason, differing accounts may demonstrate greater
effectiveness when the injury severity is low and lesser effectiveness when the injury
severity is high.
Defendant Blameworthiness
Another factor that jurors consider when making damage award decisions is the
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. Jurors award higher damages when the
defendant's conduct is more reprehensible (Carpenter et al., 2000). According to the law,
defendant reprehensibility should influence punitive damage awards. Because
compensatory awards are designated to repay specific damages suffered by the plaintiff,
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defendant reprehensibility should not influence compensatory decisions. In contrast,
because the purpose of punitive awards is to punish and deter, the wrongfulness of the

defendant's conduct should influence punitive damages awarded.
In alignment with legal intentions, the extent of wrongdoing does influence
punitive award amounts. One study asked mock jurors to make damage award decisions
in a case concerning harmful chemicals being released into an area (Horowitz & Bordens,
1990). The chemicals were released during a corporation's manufacturing process and
several plaintiffs alleged physical ailments as a result of the chemicals. When the
defendant had a greater length of time to foresee the problems, the jurors levied higher
punitive awards against the defendants. Also, as perceived responsibility on the part of

the plaintiff diminished, the punitive award amounts increased. Both of these findings
indicate that higher punitive awards are given in situations in which the defendant is
perceived as more blameworthy.
Further research indicates that defendant blameworthiness may affect
compensatory awards as well as punitive awards. To determine whether jurors based their
damage award decisions on the proper legal factors, researchers manipulated several
factors including defendant reprehensibility (Cather et al., 1996). Reprehensibility of the
defendant significantly influenced punitive awards. Higher punitive awards were given
in cases involving highly reprehensible defendants. In addition, a trend indicated that
jurors levied higher compensatory awards against more reprehensible defendants.
Wissler et al.'s (1997) study of pain and suffering awards provides further support to the
notion that defendant blameworthiness influences compensatory awards. Jurors were
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somewhat more likely to award higher compensatory damages in conditions of high
defendant fault in comparison to conditions of low defendant fault.
In another study, defendant reprehensibility significantly influenced both

compensatory and punitive damage awards (Carpenter et al., 2000). After reading a case
scenario in which liability had already been determined, participants were instructed to
determine appropriate damage awards. Holding other factors constant, higher damages
were awarded in conditions in which the defendant's actions were highly reprehensible.
These findings held true regardless of the type of damage award. Therefore, despite legal
intentions, defendant reprehensibility has been shown to affect both compensatory and
punitive damages. Defendants who are more culpable in the eyes of the jury are punished
for their culpability through both higher compensatory and higher punitive damage award
decisions.
Perceived defendant reprehensibility has been shown to raise or lower the amount

of money awarded to the plaintiff. Based on these studies and the evidence provided
therein, it is reasonable to hypothesize that altering the manner in which the jury
perceives the defendant, may in turn alter the damage award decision. One way in which
it may be possible to change how jurors view defendants is by changing the way
defendants explain their negligent behavior. Will the account offered by the defendant
strengthen or reduce these perceptions of culpability? Will the type of account exert a
stronger influence when reprehensibility is low than when it is high? Past research
demonstrates that accounts are perceived differently when given by less blameworthy
offenders as opposed to more blameworthy offenders (Gonzales et al., 1994). When the
offender was highly blameworthy, account type did not influence participants'
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perceptions. Based on that research, jurors may view highly reprehensible defendants
more harshly regardless of the explanation given. However, when the defendant is less
reprehensible, certain accounts (concessions and excuses) should prove more beneficial

than others (justifications and refusals).
Corporate Versus Individual Defendants
The identity of the defendant is another factor that may influence damage award
decisions. Damage awards differ when the defendant is a corporation rather than an
individual, even when all other facts of the case are held constant (Hans & Ermann, 1989;
MacCoun, 1996). Several theories have emerged to explain why jurors hold corporations
to a different standard than they hold individuals.
The "deep pockets" theory proposes that defendants who appear to have more
money are required to pay higher damage awards than defendants who have less money.
In other words, jurors may assign damage awards based on the defendant's ability to pay.
Jurors may assume that corporations have more money than an individual, and as a result

would be in a better position to pay higher damage awards. Chin and Peterson (1985)
examined verdict data collected from Cook County, Illinois and as predicted, higher
damages were awarded against corporate defendants than against individual defendants.
These findings were the result of an analysis of archival data, rather than an experimental
study and when comparing actual cases it is impossible to hold constant all factors other
than the defendant's status. For example, cases against corporations are more likely to
have multiple defendants and are more likely to be high stakes cases than cases against
individual defendants. Thus, it is impossible to draw conclusions about causation.
However, when a statistical analysis was done to control for other factors, such as
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number of defendants, the differences between corporate and individual awards still
emerged. These differences were greatest in situations in which the plaintiff's injuries
were severe.
In one mock jury experiment, participants were assigned to groups and told that
they were going to make damage award decisions concerning a civil trial (Wasserman &

Robinson, 1980). In the individual conditions, the defendant was an individual by the
name of Mr. Holden who earned around $30,000 per year and did not have any insurance.
In the corporate conditions, the defendant was identified as Holden Corporation, an
"average" corporation with approximately $2 million in assets. Aside from the identity
of the defendant, all other case characteristics remained the same. All mock jurors were
told that the defendant had admitted full responsibility for the accident and that their
responsibility was to determine an appropriate damage award amount. Participants in
this study made a single damage award decision, with no distinction between
compensatory and punitive awards. Jurors awarded significantly more money to the
plaintiff when the defendant was a corporation as opposed to an individual providing
evidence in support of the deep pockets hypothesis.
Upon further examination of the research conditions used in this study, alternate
hypotheses emerge. One important difference between the two groups is the description
of the defendant's income. By giving information as to the income of the defendants, the
experimenters introduced an additional factor into the study. The participants are
explicitly told that assets of the corporation tremendously outweigh the income of the
individual. This difference alone could produce differences in damage awards. In
addition, insurance information is included in the individual condition, but is not included
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in the corporate condition. It is possible to imagine that mock jurors could have based
their decisions on the likelihood that a corporation would have insurance to cover such

damages, whereas the individual did not. In conclusion, although a corporate/individual
difference was found in damage awards, this difference may be attributable to factors
other than the status of the defendant.

Several other studies have examined jurors' responses to wrongdoing on the part
of individuals as compared to corporations. In one experiment, participants read
information about a civil case in which persons became ill after being subjected to
harmful materials by either Mr. Jones or Jones Corporation (Hans & Ermann, 1989). No
further descriptions of the defendants were given, and the only difference between the
case scenarios was the name of the defendant. Participants were asked to make liability
and compensatory damage award decisions in this case. The compensatory award
decisions were broken down into four categories: hospital bills, doctor bills, pain and
suffering, and total award. Consistent with past findings, corporate defendants were

required to pay higher damages than individual defendants. These findings held true
across all four categories of damages. Moreover, the corporate defendant was
significantly more likely to be found liable than the individual defendant.
New reasons for these findings emerged. In the past, damage award discrepancies
between corporate and individual defendants had been attributed to the deep pockets
theory. Hans and Ermann (1989) theorized that such a discrepancy could be due to
corporations being held to a higher standard of conduct than individuals. Thus, when
mistakes are made or people are injured, the public is more outraged by corporate
wrongdoing than individual wrongdoing. Indeed, the authors did find that the corporate
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conduct, although identical to the individual conduct, was viewed as more reckless and
the resulting injuries as more foreseeable.

MacCoun (1996) tested the "deep pockets" theory versus the "higher standard"
theory more directly. Past experiments testing the deep pockets hypothesis contained a

confound. The deep pockets hypothesis is based on the wealth of the defendant.
Defendants that are perceived as more wealthy would be required to pay higher monetary
damages than less wealthy defendants. Past research has tested this by comparing
damages levied against corporate defendants with damages levied against individual
defendants. When findings indicated that corporate defendants were required to pay
larger awards than individuals, experimenters cited such results as support for the deep
pocket hypothesis. MacCoun (1996) noted that such experiments confound wealth with
defendant's status as a corporation or individual. To eliminate this confound, the author
designed an experiment with three defendant conditions: a wealthy corporation, a wealthy
individual, and a poor individual. The defendant's assets were described identically in
the wealthy individual condition and the wealthy corporation condition. In this way, it
could be determined whether the disparity in damages was the result of defendant wealth,
as the deep pocket hypothesis states, or the result of corporations being held to a different
standard than individuals.
Participants read several scenarios and decided liability and damages in each case.
As was found previously (Hans & Ermann, 1989), participants were more likely to find
corporate defendants liable than they were to find individual defendants liable. There
was no difference in liability decisions between the two types of individual defendants,
however. The same trend held true for damage decisions as for liability decisions. There
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were no significant differences between damage awards for the wealthy and the poor
individual; however, awards against corporate defendants were significantly higher than
awards against wealthy individual defendants.
According to the deep pocket hypothesis, defendants of comparable wealth should
be treated similarly and should be required to pay larger damage awards than defendants
of lesser wealth. MacCoun (1996) demonstrated that when defendant wealth was held
constant, the corporate/individual bias remained. These results are inconsistent with the

deep pocket theory. Such findings tend to lend support to the theory that corporations are
held to a higher standard of conduct than individuals (Hans & Ermann, 1989). In
addition, they raise questions as to the accuracy of the widely held beliefs concerning

deep pocket defendants.
Further research provides additional support for the notion that corporations are

required to pay higher damages than individuals. After reading a case scenario and
judicial instructions, community members who had reported for jury duty decided both

compensatory and punitive damages (Carpenter, et al., 2000). The judicial instructions
contained the information that the defendant had previously been found liable for
damages suffered by the plaintiff. The sole responsibility of the participants was to
decide what amount of damages was fair and reasonable. Holding all other case factors
constant, the identification of the defendant as a corporation or an individual influenced
both type of damage awards. In punitive award decisions, in which assets of the
defendant may be considered, significantly higher damages were awarded against
corporate defendants than individual defendants. In compensatory award decisions, in
which decisions should be based solely of plaintiff characteristics, there were marginally
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significant differences with awards against corporations again higher than those against

individuals.
Regardless of the reasoning, corporate defendants can expect to be held to a
different standard than individual defendants. As a result of this different standard, an

abundance of research indicates that higher damage awards tend to be levied against
corporate defendants. This appears to hold true for both compensatory and punitive
damage awards. This evidence leads to questions concerning corporate versus individual
accounts. Will accounts proffered by corporations be perceived differently than accounts
proffered by individuals? Will an apology by an individual be more easily accepted than
an apology from a corporation? Will different accounts be more effective for
corporations than for individuals? Research demonstrates that corporations are held to a

higher standard than individuals (Hans & Ermann, 1989). Participants regard mistakes
by corporations as more offensive than mistakes by individuals. The account literature
shows that accounts are less effective for more offensive behavior than for less offensive
behavior. Therefore, mock jurors may be more receptive to accounts given by
individuals than to those given by corporations.
This literature demonstrates that a variety of factors, either in congruence with or
in opposition to what was legally intended, influence the way that jurors make damage
award decisions. Case-specific factors, such as injury severity, defendant
reprehensibility, and defendant status influence damage award amounts. Research has
also shown that the type of account that is given to explain an act influences the way that
the act and actor are perceived. Given that evidence, the account that defendants offer for
their actions may influence how jurors perceive them. In turn, juror perceptions
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influence damage awards. By examining the account literature in the context of civil
disputes, it is possible to examine whether the way defendants choose to explain their

behavior directly or indirectly influences the amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs.
Common legal practice dictates that civil defendants should deny responsibility for the
negligent act or attempt to place the responsibility elsewhere. However, through research
such as this, it can be determined whether accepting responsibility in the liability phase of
a civil trial would actually benefit the defendant in the damage phase of the trial. This
question is particularly pertinent in cases in which there is high evidence of defense

liability.
Overview
The purpose of this research was to examine whether the account given by the
defense would affect either compensatory or punitive award decisions. This was done by
examining the effects of four types of accounts that can be given to explain behavior
within a legal context on juror decisions. I compared denials, the typical account used in
civil disputes, to the other available accounts, to determine whether a more apologetic

account would influence the damage phase of the trial. The value of a more apologetic
strategy would be evident only in cases in which the liability is quite clear in favor of the
plaintiff so that was the focus of this study. In addition, I manipulated severity of plaintiff
injury, reprehensibility of the defendant, and the defendant's status as a corporation or an
individual to ascertain whether these factors interacted with the type of account offered.
Each of these factors was examined across three civil case scenarios to increase the
generalizability of these findings. In each of these three cases, the defendant was clearly
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liable for the plaintiff's injuries. I also examined whether a defense stipulation of
negligence, as opposed to no stipulation of negligence, would affect damage awards.
Based on the previously presented research, the following hypotheses were

generated.
Hypothesis la. Account type will not affect compensatory awards.

Hypothesis

1b.

Punitive awards will be smaller when defendants proffer concessions and

excuses, than when they proffer justifications and refusals.
Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of injury severity and higher levels of defendant
reprehensibility will result in higher compensatory and punitive damage awards.
Hypothesis 3. Jurors will assess higher compensatory and punitive damage awards
against corporate defendants than against individual defendants.

Hypothesis 4. Account type will have a greater effect on punitive awards when the injury
is low as opposed to when it is high.
Hypothesis 5. Account type will have a greater effect on punitive awards when defendant
reprehensibility is low as opposed to when it is high.
Hypothesis 6. Concessions and excuses will not be as effective in lowering damage
awards when offered by corporations as when offered by individuals.
Hypothesis 7. When an apologetic account (concession or excuse) is given, stipulations
of negligence will lead to lower damage awards than will jury decisions of negligence.
Pilot Study
Participants
Eighty-two jury-eligible community members served as participants for the pilot
testing of this study. I recruited participants from the jury pools at the Dade and Broward
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County Courthouses. Potential jurors who had not been selected as the end of the day
drew near were asked to volunteer to participate in this experiment. All participants were
informed that their participation was voluntary and their responses were anonymous.
Participants were not compensated for their participation.

Materials and Design
Each participant received a survey packet that contained several portions. The
first page in the packet was an informed consent form. This form outlined that juror
participation was voluntary and that their answers would not be connected to their names.

In addition, this page provided general information about the purpose of the experiment,
thanked the participants for their help, and provided information about how to contact the
experimenter if they wished to receive results of the experiment.

The next section of the survey packet consisted of three civil case scenarios. Each
scenario contained descriptions of the plaintiff and the defendant, a brief case summary,
and an outline of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Following the case summary was a
set of judge's instructions. The instructions stated that a jury had found the defendant
liable and asked participants to decide both compensatory and punitive damage awards.
The case scenarios include a product liability case, an auto negligence case, and a
medical malpractice case (Appendix A). All cases were revisions of scenarios tested by
Greene, Johns, and Smith (in press).
Product Liability Case. In this case, an employee (plaintiff) who demonstrated
cleaning products became ill from the products, and as a result is suing her employer
(defendant). The employer is accused of not providing sufficient warnings about the
dangers of the product. The defendant is described as either a corporation (Morgan
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Chemicals, Inc.) or an individual (Robert Morgan) who did not follow federal standards
in the labeling of their product.

The plaintiff developed asthma and respiratory problems as a result of inhaling
the cleaning product while performing her work duties. In the low injury severity
conditions, a doctor instructed the plaintiff to work only part-time and states that the

plaintiff can expect flare-ups when she is tired or stressed. In the high injury severity
condition, the doctor advised that the plaintiff may work only part-time for the time being
and that within the next ten years her condition is likely to worsen leaving her unable to
work. She is also likely to develop lung cancer and emphysema and must have
respiratory therapy for the remainder of her life.
In low reprehensibility conditions, a chemist who worked for the company

reviewed the label and did not recommend any changes. In the high reprehensibility
condition, the label was inconsistent with the safety data sheet for the product. The
safety sheet warned of the dangers of breathing vapors from the cleaner and stated that
the cleaner contained caustic chemicals. The label claimed that the cleaner contained no
caustic chemicals and contained no warning.
The defendant explains the questionable behavior in one of four ways. In one
scenario, the defendant accepts responsibility, apologizes, and describes new techniques
employed by the company to prevent such occurrences in the future (concession). As an
excuse, the defendant explains that the chemist responsible for the safety labeling was
going through a divorce and suffering from depression. He made a mistake when reading
the safety sheet and mislabeled the product. The justification account states that internal
testing demonstrated no dangers associated with the chemicals and therefore no warnings
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were needed. In the final scenario, the defendant denies any fault for the plaintiff's

illness (refusal).
Medical Malpractice Case. This case concerns a stroke victim who received
inadequate care in a nursing home facility. Following his stroke, a gentleman was placed
in the nursing home. After a period of time, he had to be returned to the hospital and

doctors found that he was malnourished and suffering from an infection due to bedsores.
The plaintiff, the victim's wife, sued the nursing home for medical negligence on behalf
of her husband. The defendant is described either as Peri-Care, Inc. (corporation) or
Raymond Perry (individual).
In the mild injury condition, the victim was malnourished and had a 4-inch
gangrenous bedsore. He required hospitalization for two weeks and it was a month

before he returned to his prior state. In the severe injury condition, the victim was badly
malnourished with a 10-inch gangrenous bedsore. An infection from the bedsore left him
in intensive care for three weeks and he will never return to his prior state of health.
Lower reprehensibility conditions state that nursing home records were not properly kept
and were often falsified. In high reprehensibility conditions, there was also poor record
keeping and record falsification. In addition, the facility was short-staffed and an exemployee testified to poor care of the nursing home residents and improper conduct of
other employees, such as sleeping and smoking marijuana on the job.
The defendant gives one of the following accounts for their behavior. In the
concessionary account, the defendant accepts responsibility for the occurrence, offers an
apology and tells of changes that have been instituted since the incident. The excuse
account offers an apology followed by the claim that the primary nurse was having
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personal difficulties and falsified the records. The justification states that the victim was
already in poor health and his condition was caught before it got too serious. In the
refusal, the defendant asserts that the facility is in no way responsible for the victim's

injuries.
Automobile Negligence Case. This case concerns injuries resulting from an
automobile accident. A truck driver was en route to a delivery when he entered a
construction zone. Upon entering the construction zone, the truck driver lost control of

his vehicle and the front axle from his truck struck another car injuring the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is suing the defendant alleging that the driver was negligent. The defendant is
defined either as Anderson Trucking Corporation or Robert Anderson (owner of the
trucking company).
In the mild injury condition, the plaintiff suffered a concussion and some soft
tissue injuries. He is fully mobile but will be forced to endure pain for the remainder of
his life. In the severe injury condition, the plaintiff suffered skull fractures and was in a
coma. He emerged from the coma but is still bedridden and mute. He will most likely
remain completely dependent for the remainder of his life. In the low reprehensibility
condition, the driver was driving approximately 5 mph over the speed limit and had one
speeding ticket in the last 6 years. In the high reprehensibility condition, the driver was
driving approximately 15 mph over the speed limit, did not use the proper braking
technique, and had 3 speeding tickets in the last 6 years.
The defendant accounted for the behavior in four different manners. In one
scenario, the defendant admitted wrongdoing and apologized (concession). Another
scenario consists of an apology and a claim that the construction zone was not well
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marked and the accident was beyond the driver's control (excuse). The next scenario
proposed that although the driver did cause the wreck, he handled the truck very
effectively and prevented the accident from being much worse (justification). In the final

account, the defendant accepts no responsibility for the accident (refusal).
Procedure
After reading each scenario, participants indicated their agreement to a series of

statements, which served as manipulation checks, on 7-point Likert-type scales with
higher numbers representing stronger agreement. To assess the effectiveness of the
injury severity manipulations, I averaged participant's ratings of three statements across
the three scenarios: the plaintiff's life will never be the same as a result of this incident,
the degree of pain and suffering on the part of the plaintiff was minimal, and the
plaintiff's injuries were not severe (Cronbach's alpha =78). To assess the effectiveness of
reprehensibility manipulation, I averaged participant ratings of three additional
statements across the three scenarios: the defendant's behavior was reckless, the
defendant acted in this manner knowing that harm would occur, and the necessary
precautions to prevent this type of incident were taken (Cronbach's alpha = .74).
Corporate status was assessed by averaging responses to the statements: a damage award
will cause financial hardship for the defendant and the defendant should have no
difficulty paying an amount awarded against him (Cronbach's alpha = .77). Averaged
responses to the statements the defendant truly regrets his behavior, the defendant
appears to regret his actions, and the defendant accepted responsibility for his actions
assessed the account manipulations (Cronbach's alpha = .87).
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Results
For each of the manipulation checks, I conducted a 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury

Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2 (Corporate Status) X 3 (Case Type) repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with case type as a within-subject variable.
The injury severity manipulation produced a significant main effect on jurors'

perceptions of injury severity, F(1, 50) = 24.03, p < .001, 112 = .33 (Ms = 6.00 and 7.44
for low and high injury severity, respectively). Ratings of defendant reprehensibility
differed significantly as a function of the reprehensibility manipulation, F(1, 50) = 11.58,
p < .001, 1 2 = .19 (Ms = 4.87 and 5.94 for low and high reprehensibility, respectively).
Manipulation of defendant status significantly affected juror perceptions of defendant
wealth, F(1, 47) = 7.84, p < .007,

7j

2

= .14 (Ms = 5.19 and 6.14 for individual and

corporate defendants, respectively). Additionally, account type affected juror perceptions
of defendant's remorse, F(3, 50) = 18.43, p < .001, 32 = .55(Ms = 5.99, 4.02, 3.24, and
2.83 for concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals, respectively). Because jurors
appeared to perceive my manipulations as I intended, I proceeded to collect data on the
types of damage awards jurors would make in response to these scenarios.
Damage Award Study
Participants
Five hundred and forty-one jury-eligible community served as participants in this
study. I recruited participants from the jury pools at the Dade and Broward County
Courthouses. Potential jurors who had not been selected as the end of the day drew near
were asked to volunteer to participate in this experiment. All participants were informed
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that their participation was voluntary and their responses were anonymous. Participants
were not compensated for their participation.

Design
The experiment was a 4 (Account: Concessions, Excuses, Justifications, vs.
Refusals) X 2 (Injury Severity: High vs. Low) X 2 (Reprehensibility: High vs. Low) X 2
(Corporate Status: Individual vs. Corporate) X 3 (Case Type: Product Liability, Medical
Malpractice vs. Automobile Negligence) factorial design with case type as a withinsubject variable. In each of these scenarios, participants were told that a jury had already
found the defendant liable and that it was their duty to assess damages.
Four dangling control conditions were added in which the participants were told

that the defense had stipulated negligence. This stipulation of negligence is in contrast to
the remainder of the conditions, which stated that a jury had previously found the
defendant liable. I predicted that account would have the greatest effect when injury was
mild and reprehensibility was low. Therefore, in all four dangling control conditions,
injury severity was mild and defendant reprehensibility was low. I used only two types
of accounts in these conditions as justifications and refusals are not compatible with a
defense stipulation of negligence. Therefore, in each of the four conditions, the account
type is either a concession or an excuse. I also manipulated corporate status as I felt that
a stipulation of negligence by a corporation might be perceived differently by jurors than
a stipulation of negligence by an individual. The resulting four conditions included a
concession/individual condition, a concession/corporate condition, an excuse/individual
condition, and an excuse/corporate condition. In each group, injury severity was mild,
reprehensibility was low, and the defendant stipulated negligence.
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Materials
Each survey packet included the three case scenarios described in the pilot

materials and one type of account for all three scenarios. In other words, within each
packet, the type of account given to explain the facts was held constant. The scenarios
were counterbalanced to prevent position effects. Reprehensibility level, injury severity,

and corporate status were also held constant across the three scenarios within each
packet. For example, if one scenario consisted of a defendant of higher reprehensibility,
then both of the other two scenarios within that packet also consisted of defendants with
higher reprehensibility.
Immediately after reading the case information, participants read judge's
instructions and made damage awards decisions (Appendix B). For compensatory
awards, participants read instructions informing them that compensatory awards were
designed to return the injured party to his/her former state. The instructions then
prompted participants to enter an amount that they felt would fairly and justly
compensate the plaintiff for the harm suffered. Each scenario provided three categories
for which compensatory damages could be awarded. These categories included medical
expenses, either loss of wages or loss of consortium, and pain and suffering. After
making compensatory decisions, judicial instructions informed participants that punitive
awards were intended to punish the defendant for untoward conduct and to deter like
conduct, by this defendant or other defendants in the future. Instructions then prompted
jurors to provide an amount they felt would satisfy this purpose, if necessary. Following
their award decisions on each case were questions about the participants' feelings and
attitudes about each case (Appendix C). The questions in this section were those used in
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the pilot study to check on the effectiveness of the manipulations. These questions were
answered immediately after the participants made award decisions on each case. As in the
pilot study, the reliability of three of the scales created from these measures were

adequate (alpha for injury severity = .78; defendant wealth alpha = .68; remorse alpha =
.87). Although the reprehensibility scale obtained adequate reliability in the pilot study
(alpha = .74), the reliability for the reprehensibility scale in this study was lower
(Cronbach's alpha = .59)
There were three sets of these questions in each packet so that a set of questions
followed each case scenario. The set of questions asked after each case was identical. In
this way, participants read a case summary, made compensatory and punitive damage

award decisions, and then answered a set of questions about that case. The participants
then moved on to the following case summary, which was followed by questions to be
answered concerning that case and so on. All questions about a specific case were
answered before the participant moved on to the next case.
The final portion of the survey packet was a brief demographic questionnaire
(Appendix D). This questionnaire asked general information about each participant and
provided researchers with information about the demographic make-up of the sample.
Procedure
The experimenter announced to Dade and Broward County venirepersons that a
study was being conducted to examine jury decision-making in civil cases.
Venirepersons were informed that the study consisted of reading civil cases summaries
and making damage award decisions based upon those summaries. They were told that
after those decisions were made, they would be asked to complete the brief questionnaire
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that follows. The surveys were randomly distributed to volunteers who were asked to
read an informed consent, read the case scenarios, and fully complete the questionnaire.
Once the questionnaire was completed, the participants returned it to the experimenter.
At that point participants were allowed to ask the experimenter any questions they may

have had and then each was thanked and debriefed.
Results
Separate 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2 (Corporate
Status) X 3 (Case Type) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with case
type as a within-subject variable were performed for the economic, non-economic, and
the punitive damages. The three levels of case type were included in this study to ensure
that any results will generalize and that results were not case-specific. Results from these

ANOVA's demonstrated few effects for case type. Out of 105 possible interactions
between scenario and one of the manipulated variables, only sixteen proved significant.
The small number of significant interactions, as compared to the large number of possible
interactions, indicates that the significant results were most likely due to chance. As a
result, I collapsed across case type and reanalyzed the data. I performed the following
analyses on the collapsed data.
Manipulation Checks
For each of the manipulation checks, I conducted a 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury
Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2 (Corporate Status) X 3 (Case Type) repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with case type as a within-subject variable.
The injury severity manipulation produced a significant main effect on jurors'
perceptions of injury severity, F(1, 410) = 105.61, p < .001, r2 = .21 (Ms = 6.26 and 7.46
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for low and high injury severity, respectively). Ratings of defendant reprehensibility

differed significantly as a function of the reprehensibility manipulation, F(1, 410)

=

108.04, p < .001, 7 2 = .21 (Ms = 5.19 and 6.32 for low and high reprehensibility,
respectively). Manipulation of defendant status significantly affected juror perceptions of
defendant wealth, F(1, 402) = 35.79, p < .001, q2 = .08 (Ms = 5.10 and 5.99 for
individual and corporate defendants, respectively). Additionally, account type affected
juror perceptions of defendant's remorse, F(3, 409) = 103.76, p < .001, '2 = .43(Ms =
5.92, 4.17, 3.59, and 2.82 for concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals,
respectively). Because jurors appeared to perceive my manipulations as I intended, I
proceeded to analyze the data on the types of damage awards jurors would make in
response to these scenarios.
Compensatory Damages
For purpose of analysis, compensatory awards were divided into economic and
non-economic damages. Economic damages consist of all awards except pain and
suffering and non-economic damages are made up solely of pain and suffering awards.
All analyses were conducted on log-transformed data because the data were positively
skewed. However, for clarity of explanation, reported means were derived from nontransformed data.
A 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2 (Corporate
Status) ANOVA was performed on the economic awards. For economic awards, the only
38
significant main effect was for injury, F(1, 440) = 51. , p <.001, i12 = .11. Jurors

awarded higher economic damages to plaintiff's who were severely injured (M =
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135,656, SD = 7022) than to plaintiffs whose injuries were less severe (M = 84,053, SD =

7045).
There was also a marginally significant 3-way interaction of Status X

Reprehensibility X Account, F(3, 440) = 2.60, p < .052, i2= .02 (see Table E l for
means). Simple effects analyses revealed that the interaction was driven by the
interaction of defendant status and defendant reprehensibility when the defendant

proffered a justification for the alleged wrong-doing. When a corporate defendant
proffered a justification, defendant reprehensibility did not affect jurors' economic
awards, F(1, 440) < 1, ns. In contrast, when an individual defendant proffered a
justification, jurors' awarded higher economic damages when the defendant's actions
were highly reprehensible than when the defendant's actions were low in reprehensibility,
E(1, 440) = 9.18, p = .003. For the conditions in which defendants proffered concessions,
excuses, or refusals, none of the simple effects tests of reprehensibility within defendant
status were significant, all Fs < 1.78, ns.
I performed a 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2
(Corporate Status) ANOVA on the non-economic damage awards. For non-economic
awards, there were significant main effects for both injury, F(1,431) = 29.65, p< .001, 72
=

.06, and reprehensibility, F(1,431) = 4.91, p < .03,

f

2

= .01. Participants awarded

higher pain and suffering awards when injuries were more severe (M = 512,878, SD =
19,074) as opposed to less severe (M = 293,481, SD = 19,179). Jurors also awarded
higher damages in cases in which the defendant was highly reprehensible (M = 416,273,
SD = 19,211) rather than less reprehensible (M = 390,085, SD = 19,046).
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There was also a significant two-way interaction of Status X Account, F(3,431)=
3.10, p_< .03, it = .02 (see Table E2 for means). When defendants proffered excuses,

jurors' awarded higher pain and suffering awards against individual defendants than they
did against corporate defendants, F(1, 431)= 6.75, p = .01. Defendant status did not
influence jurors' pain and suffering awards when defendants proffered concessions,

justifications, or refusals, all Es < 2.0, ns.
This two-way interaction was qualified by a significant 3-way interaction of
Status X Reprehensibility X Account, F(3,431) = 3.64, p_< .01,

112 = .03 (see Table E3 for

means). Defendant status and reprehensibility interacted to influence pain and suffering
awards when defendants proffered excuses or justifications. When individual defendants

proffered excuses, defendant reprehensibility did not influence awards, F < 1, n;
however, when the defendant was a corporation and offered an excuse, jurors did give
higher pain and suffering awards when reprehensibility was high than when it was low,
F(1, 431) = 11.23, p < .001. A different pattern of effects occurred when defendants
offered justifications. When individual defendants proffered justifications, jurors gave
higher non-economic awards when reprehensibility was high than when it was low, F(1,
431)= 4.52, p < .04. When corporate defendants proffered justifications, reprehensibility
did not influence pain and suffering awards, F < 1, ns. Reprehensibility and defendant
status did not interact to influence pain and suffering awards when defendants offered
concessions or refusals, all Es < 1.94, ns.
Punitive Damages
I performed a final 4 (Account) X 2 (Injury Severity) X 2 (Reprehensibility) X 2
(Corporate Status) ANOVA on the punitive awards. For punitive damages, there was a
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significant main effect for reprehensibility, F(1,358) = 4.81, p < .03,

1

2

=.01. Jurors

awarded higher punitive damages when the defendant was more reprehensible (M =

629,494, SD = 59,842) rather than less reprehensible (M = 432,822, SD = 60,722). No
interactions were significant.

Effects of Stipulating Negligence
A 2 (Status) X 2 (Account) X 2 (Stipulation) ANOVA was performed on each
economic damages, non-economic damages, and punitive damages to analyze the data
from the dangling control conditions. There were no significant effects of these variables
for the punitive damage awards.

Economic damage awards. The analysis of economic damages demonstrated no
significant main effects, but the 3-way interaction of Status X Account X Stipulation was
significant, F(1,111) = 5.79, p <.02,

,

2

= .05 (see Table E4 for means). For individual

defendants, account did not interact with negligence stipulations to influence economic

damage awards, both Fs < 2.40, ns. In contrast, when corporate defendants offered
concessions, jurors awarded lower economic damages when the defendant stipulated
negligence than when they did not, F(1, 111) = 6.13, p < .02. When corporate defendants
offered excuses, stipulation of negligence did not influence economic awards, F < 1, ns.
Non-economic damage awards. The ANOVA performed on the non-economic
damages also demonstrated no significant main effects. There was a significant two-way
2
interaction of Status X Account, F(1,108) = 7.56, p <.007, r1 = .07 (see Table E5 for

means). When defendants proffered concessions, jurors' awarded higher pain and
suffering awards when the defendant was a corporation than when it was an individual,
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F(1, 108)

=

6.68, p < .02. When defendants proffered excuses, defendant status did not

influence non-economic damage awards, F(1, 108) = 1.70, ns.
Analyses of the non-economic damage awards also revealed a significant Status X

Stipulation interaction, F(1,108) = 6.36, p <.01, 12= .06 (see Table E6 for means). When
individual defendants stipulated negligence, jurors made lower non-economic damage

awards than when they did not stipulate negligence, F(1, 108) = 4.02, p < .05. The
stipulation of negligence did not influence pain and suffering awards levied against
corporate defendants, F(1, 108) = 2.47, ns. If anything, there was a trend toward jurors'
levying higher damages against corporate defendants that stipulated negligence in
comparison with corporate defendants that did not.
Finally, there was a significant two-way Account X Stipulation interaction,

F(1,108) = 4.53, p <.04, TI 2 = .04 (see Table E7 for means). Although none of the simple
effects tests met traditional levels of significance, there was a trend for jurors to award

higher non-economic damages when defendants proffered concessions but did not
stipulate negligence than when defendants both conceded and stipulated negligence, F(1,
108) = 2.90, p < .10. Negligence stipulation did not influence damage awards when
defendants proffered excuses, F(1, 1,08) = 1.74, ns.
Discussion
Previous studies have demonstrated that injury severity, defendant
reprehensibility, and the defendant's status as an individual or corporation influences
jurors' damage award decisions. This study examined whether the account given by
defendants also influences those award decisions and how accounts proffered by
defendants interact with the previously mentioned factors. Among others, this study
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addressed the following questions: Does account type affect damage award decisions and
if so, does it affect compensatory and punitive damages differently? Will the effect of
account type be moderated by the severity of the plaintiff's injuries or the defendant's
reprehensibility? Will certain accounts be more effective dependent upon whether the

defendant is a corporation or an individual?
Injury Severity

In congruence with past research (Bovbjerg, et al., 1991; Cather et al., 1996),
injury severity influenced damage awards. I predicted that injury severity would affect
both compensatory and punitive awards. Injury severity did significantly affect both
types of compensatory award (economic and non-economic). In the analysis of economic
damages, which consisted primarily of medical expenses and lost wages, jurors gave
higher awards when the plaintiff suffered more severe injuries. Not only was this finding
expected, but also it is legally appropriate. In an actual case, plaintiffs who suffer more
severe injuries would typically require more money to cover the cost of higher medical
bills and longer periods of time without working. Equally consistent with legal intentions
is the finding that jurors awarded higher non-economic (pain and suffering) awards to
more severely injured plaintiffs. It is reasonable that participants would award higher
damages for pain and suffering to plaintiffs who have endured more severe injuries. The
greater the injury, the greater the suffering. If the suffering is greater, then the
compensation for that suffering should also be greater.
A caveat concerning the influence of injury severity on economic damage awards
must be noted. As previously stated, injury severity influenced economic damages in this
study. Researchers both predicted and expected this finding. However, some differences
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between this study and actual cases exist which make this finding more noteworthy. In
the present study, researchers provided participants with specific amounts as to what the
plaintiff was requesting for each of the economic components (e.g., medical expenses,
lost wages). The amount requested by the plaintiff remained constant regardless of the

injury condition. For example, within a given scenario, the requested amount for medical
expenses was the same, whether the description consisted of a severely injured plaintiff
or a mildly injured plaintiff. Had the jurors merely been awarding the amount requested,
thereby compensating the plaintiff for the losses suffered, there should be no difference in
the economic damage category between awards for severely injured plaintiffs and mildly
injured plaintiffs. That, however, is not what was shown. Mock jurors adjusted the
numbers given to them based upon the degree of plaintiff injury.
I also predicted that injury would influence punitive awards. Contrary to that
prediction, injury severity did not exhibit an effect on punitive damages. Participants did
not choose to punish the defendants with higher awards based on the fact that the plaintiff
was severely injured which is a legally appropriate decision. These findings provide
evidence that jurors did consider the plaintiff's injuries when it was legally appropriate,
but did not consider injury severity when it was not legally appropriate. Although
research on this topic has been mixed in the past, these findings are encouraging.
Injury severity did not interact with account type or any other manipulated
variable. This held true across all damage categories. Although jurors awarded larger
amounts to severely injured plaintiffs, as opposed to mildly injured plaintiffs, the account
proffered by the defendant, defendant status, and defendant reprehensibility did not
moderate the influence of injury severity on compensatory awards.
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Defendant Reprehensibility
The law allows jurors to consider defendant reprehensibility only when making
punitive award decisions. I predicted that defendant reprehensibility would influence
both compensatory and punitive award decisions. In accordance with legal intentions but

in opposition to my prediction, defendant reprehensibility did not influence economic
damage awards. In accordance with both legal intentions and my hypothesis, jurors did

consider defendant reprehensibility when making punitive award decisions. In both of
these situations, jurors based their decisions on the factors deemed appropriate by the
law. Defendant reprehensibility, however, did influence jurors inappropriately when
making pain and suffering award decisions. Pain and suffering awards are the

compensatory awards in which the most variability is expected. Our system gives jurors
the difficult task of applying a dollar amount to fairly compensate a plaintiff for a vague
construct. Although in this study jurors were given an amount requested by the plaintiff,
jurors know that that number is not based upon hard figures in the same way that medical
expenses are. As has been found in previous research, jurors inappropriately considered
defendant reprehensibility when making pain and suffering awards (Cather et al., 1996,
Carpenter et al., 2000).
In addition to the main effects of reprehensibility found in this study,
reprehensibility also influenced awards by interacting with other variables. The effects of
defendant reprehensibility were apparent when defendants accounted for their behavior
using either justifications or excuses. For both economic and non-economic damages,
justifications resulted in lower damage awards when offered by low reprehensibility
individuals rather than high reprehensibility individuals. Additionally, in non-economic
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awards, excuses resulted in lower awards when provided by less reprehensible
corporations as opposed to more reprehensible corporations.
In offering justifications and excuses, defendants are not merely providing an
apology or denying fault as in concessions and refusals. With justifications and excuses,

the defendant attempts to provide an explanation for the wrongdoing. More specifically,
justifications attempt to shift the blame from one party to another and excuses attempt to

reduce the perceived responsibility of the excuse-provider (Snyder & Higgins, 1988).
Because jurors hold corporations to a higher standard than individuals (Hans &
Ermann, 1989), defendant characteristics other than corporate status may have more
impact on awards for individual defendants than for corporate defendants. The mere fact
that the defendant was a corporation may outweigh other factors in the minds of the
jurors. This may explain why reprehensibility did not influence awards against corporate
defendants who proffered justifications. Therefore, there would be no effect for
defendant reprehensibility for corporate defendants who offered justifications. In other
words, jurors may not accept this blame-shifting from any corporation, regardless of the
offensiveness of the defendant's behavior. However, for individual defendants, that may
not be the case. If the defendant is an individual, jurors may rely on additional defense
characteristics, such as defendant reprehensibility, when making damage award
decisions. Given those circumstances, it is both logical and intuitive that jurors would
believe an individual's justification more readily when the individual's actions were less
as opposed to more offensive.
Reprehensibility also influenced awards when corporations offered excuses, but
not when individuals offered excuses. The goal of an excuse is to make the provider of
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the excuse appear less responsible for the behavior committed or the results of that
behavior. Being perceived as less responsible should lead to a reduction in the amount of
damage awards levied against the defendant. A possible explanation for this finding may

be that jurors view individual defendants as less responsible for wrongdoing than
corporate defendants, regardless of reprehensibility level. Reprehensibility, then, would
not influence how excuses proffered by individuals are perceived thereby not affecting
amounts awarded against the individual defendants proffering excuses. Defendant
reprehensibility, however, would affect corporate defendants proffering excuses.

Corporate defendants would face more difficulty than individuals in providing jurors with
a convincing excuse that would lead to a reduced perception of responsibility. As a result,
the effectiveness of an excuse provided by a corporation would be moderated by the
reprehensibility of the defendant's actions. In situations in which the corporation did not
act offensively, jurors may accept the excuse leading to a reduction in damage awards.
However, when the corporation did act offensively, jurors may reject the excuse and
award higher damages.
Interestingly, jurors did not look to defendant reprehensibility to help with award
decisions when individuals proffered concessions, excuses, or refusals. In the same
manner, jurors did not look to defendant reprehensibility to help with award decisions
when corporations proffered concessions, justifications, or refusals. Further studies could
investigate why these trends were not consistent across account conditions. In any event,
individual defendants should carefully consider reprehensibility level before deciding to
respond to civil litigation using a justification. Similarly, corporate defendants should
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carefully consider the reprehensibility of their actions before choosing to respond to civil

litigation using an excuse.
Corporate Status
Previously, researchers demonstrated that a defendant's status as an individual or

a corporation directly influences the damage awards levied against them (Hans &
Ermann, 1989; MacCoun, 1996). This is true regardless of whether status is a legally
appropriate consideration (MacCoun, 1996). I predicted that a defendant's corporate
status would influence both compensatory and punitive damage awards. Surprisingly, the
present study found no main effects for corporate status. This is not to say that the
corporate status of the defendant had no influence on damage awards within this study.
Corporate status interacted with both account type and reprehensibility to influence
damage awards. I also predicted that concessions and excuses would be more effective
for individuals than for corporations. Although I found no effects of corporate status
within concessions, results did indicate that excuses lead to higher pain and suffering
awards when offered by an individual rather than a corporation.
The interactions found in this study, in congruence with previous studies, indicate
that jurors hold individuals and corporations to different standards. In pain and suffering
awards, excuses resulted in higher awards when given by an individual than when given
by a corporation. As previously discussed, this interaction was qualified by an
interaction including defendant reprehensibility. However, in light of the previous
explanation, it would be expected that excuses may be more effective for individual
defendants than for corporate defendants. Because jurors expect more foresight from
corporations, the responsibility-reducing effects of excuses may be greater for individuals
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than for corporations. For this reason, jurors receiving an excuse from an individual may
accept the excuse and reduce damage awards according. However, jurors given an
excuse by a corporation may be less accepting of the excuse resulting in little or no

change in their award decision. Thus, awards against individuals proffering excuses
would be expected to be less than awards against corporations proffering excuses. This is
not, however, what was found within this study. I believe that within this study, these
results were due to a higher order interaction involving reprehensibility which qualifies
these findings.
Account
As a result of prior research, injury severity, defendant reprehensibility, and a

defendant's corporate status are known to influence damage awards. Additionally,
research has also shown that different accounts are perceived differently and that certain
accounts are more effective than others. Research has also shown that both personal and

situational factors affect how an account is perceived. I predicted that account type
would not influence compensatory awards, but would exert an influence on punitive

awards. Contrary to those predictions, account did influence compensatory awards, but
did not influence punitive awards. There were no main effects for account type for the
three types of damage awards found in this study. However, this study demonstrated, for
the first time, that the account given by a defendant interacts with other case factors to
exert an influence on compensatory damage awards.
For both excuses and justifications, the level of defendant reprehensibility
influenced damage awards. If an individual defendant intends to explain negligent
behavior using a justification or a corporate defendant intends to explain negligent
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behavior using an excuse, the reprehensibility of the defendant's behavior should be
considered. When defendants provided concessions and refusals, the level of defendant
reprehensibility did not influence awards. However, when defendants provided excuses
and justifications, low reprehensibility defendants received lower damage awards against

them than high reprehensibility defendants. This proved true for both economic and noneconomic awards and for both individuals and corporations. These findings illustrate the
need for defendants to examine all case-relevant factors when deciding how to explain
negligent behavior.
Defense Stipulation

I collected data under conditions in which defendants' stipulated negligence to
determine whether such a stipulation, combined with either a concession or an excuse
would reduce damages awarded against them. It was anticipated that corporate status
may also influence awards in those conditions; therefore, the corporate status of the

defendant was manipulated as well. I predicted that an apologetic account would be
more effective when combined with a stipulation of negligence. The results indicate that
whether stipulations are beneficial to the defendant depend upon the account with which
they are combined and the status of the defendant proffering the stipulation.
For economic damage awards, there were no differences in damage awards for
individuals, regardless of whether a concession or an excuse was given. Additionally,
whether the individual stipulated negligence did not influence awarded amounts. When
corporations explained their behavior using excuses, defense stipulations and jury
decisions did not lead to differences in awarded amounts. However, when corporations
explained their behavior using concessions, a defense stipulation led to lower awards than

51

when negligence was not stipulated. This result can be easily explained. Once a
concession is given, there is then no reason not to stipulate negligence. By providing the
concession, defendants are accepting responsibility and admitting fault. To then not take
that admission to the final step and stipulate negligence would discredit the apology

provided. Jurors will most likely find an apology more sincere if the corporation follows
the apology with a stipulation of negligence. If following an apology, the corporation
allows the negligence decision to go to the jury, the opportunity for the apology to appear
as merely a defense strategy is increased. If instead, the corporation offers an apology
and accepts responsibility in the form of admitting negligence, the apology will appear as
less a strategic maneuver and more a sincere apology. This same trend was found for
pain and suffering awards. When a concession was combined with a stipulation of
negligence the award tended to be lower than when a concession was combined with a
jury decision. Unfortunately, I did not conduct ratings of defendant trustworthiness that

would allow for a test of this explanation; however, this may be a fruitful avenue for
future research.
Differences in pain and suffering awards were also apparent when individuals and
corporations offered concessions to explain their behavior. Accounting for behavior
using a concession led to lower damage awards for individuals than for corporations.
Because of the differences in how corporations and individuals are viewed, jurors may be
more accepting of an apology from an individual. With an individual there is only one
person, thus there is a lesser expectation of foresight than with a corporation which is
composed of many individuals (Hans & Ermann, 1989). For this reason, an apology
from an individual may seem more sincere and less contrived than an apology coming
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from a corporation. Jurors may regard apologies offered by corporations more
suspiciously than those offered by individuals, thereby leading to lower damage awards
when an individual defendant apologizes as opposed to a corporate defendant

apologizing.
For individuals, stipulating negligence produced lower awards than allowing a

jury to decide negligence. On the contrary, for corporate defendants, there was a trend
for stipulating negligence to produce higher awards than a jury decision. Therefore,
holding account constant, individuals appear to benefit more than corporations by using
negligence stipulations. This may be another effect of jurors holding corporations to a
different standard than they hold individuals. When a negligence stipulation is offered by
an individual, jurors may perceive that stipulation with less skepticism than had it been
offered by a corporation.
These results indicate that the decision whether to offer a stipulation and an
apology should be based upon the corporate status of the defendant. If the defendant is
an individual, stipulating negligence and offering an apology may prove beneficial.
When the defendant is a corporation, a better strategy may be to allow a jury to decide
negligence. If a defendant chooses to use a concession, it would be most beneficial to use
the concession in conjunction with a stipulation of negligence.
Probably the most unexpected findings were that negligence stipulations had no
significant effects on punitive awards. Because lawmakers designed punitive awards to
punish defendants, it is surprising that jurors do not punish defendants who admit
negligence differently than those who deny negligence. Further research could examine
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whether negligence stipulations influence punitive awards under circumstances not tested

here, such as with high injury plaintiffs and high reprehensibility defendants.
Conclusion
This study provides limited support to the argument that jurors have difficulty

compartmentalizing different types of damages and considering only legally appropriate
factors when making each award decision. Findings in this study are consistent with
prior research showing that certain extra-legal factors influence jurors' award decisions
(Cather et al., 1996). More interestingly, however, is the manner in which the accounts
given by the defendant influenced the awarded amounts. Concessionary accounts did not
demonstrate the reduction in punitive damages, as was predicted, and excuses and
justifications resulted in interesting trends under many different circumstances. This is
especially important because based on several high profile cases, such as those previously
reviewed, justifications appear to be a strong and common defense strategy.

Justifications provide defendants with a way to apologize without actually admitting
fault. These findings indicate that under certain circumstances using such a strategy may
be beneficial. At other times, however, such a strategy may not be a defendant's wisest
option.
The findings in this study also give rise to many new questions. Stipulation
comparisons demonstrated once again that jurors perceive individual defendants
differently than corporate defendants. It would be interesting to many in the legal
community to determine what other factors interact with those tested here and in what
other circumstances negligence stipulations are beneficial.
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This experiment addressed several questions that had not been addressed in legal
and psychological research. Although there is vast research examining the perceptions
and effectiveness of accounts, research extending the account literature into legal
contexts is sparse. This research examined not only how jurors perceived different

accounts offered by defendants in civil cases, but also how those perceptions influenced
damage awards. These findings also establish the case-specific facts, such as the degree
of plaintiff injury and the corporate status and reprehensibility of the defendant, that
outline when one account should be preferred over another account.
Limitations to this research exist. Although participants were jury-eligible
community members, the cases were presented by way of vignette. Testing the scenarios
in a more realistic setting, such as through video or live presentation would be valuable in
determining the robust nature of these findings. Additionally, the analysis of negligence
stipulations was limited, as stipulations were not the primary focus of this study. Future
studies utilizing a fully-crossed design could generate interesting and useful information
regarding negligence stipulations. These studies would provide a more in-depth
understanding of the benefits of offering such stipulations and when stipulations would
be advantageous to defendants.
Furthermore, defense strategies often consist of a combination of accounts rather
than a single account. This study provides initial information as to how single accounts
influence damage awards, but offers no data regarding compound accounts. Further
research in this area could examine the specific factors involved in each type of account,
how those factors are perceived within a legal context, and how factors from different
accounts may be combined to produce effective compound accounts. Research in this
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area may demonstrate that individual account strategies are less effective than a
compound strategy formed by blending several accounts.
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Appendix A
The following excerpt provides information about a civil court case. Please read the

information carefully and answer the questions that follow.
West v. Peri-Care Inc (Raymond Perry)
James West, a 72 year-old stroke victim, resided in Montrose Bay Health Care
Center, a nursing home in Montrose, Alabama. As a result of his stroke, Mr. West was
unable to speak or comprehend speech, suffered memory loss, and had significant
paralysis of his right side. Two months after his arrival at Montrose Bay, Mr. West's

condition had deteriorated to the point that he was transferred to the hospital.
Low injury severity: At that time, doctors discovered that he seemed to be
slightly malnourished and suffering from an infection. He also appeared to have a few
small bedsores indicating that he had not been turned as often as he should have been.
Mr. West was in the hospital for two days and it was two more weeks before he returned
to the state he was in when he arrived at Montrose Bay.
High injury severity: At that time, doctors discovered that he was badly
malnourished and suffering from a systemic infection including a gangrenous bedsore
measuring 10 inches in diameter. Mr. West was in intensive care for three weeks. His
stroke symptoms worsened and a result of the malnutrition and infection and his health
will never return to the state it was when Mr. West arrived at Montrose Bay.
Mr. West's wife, Audrey, filed a lawsuit against Peri-Care Inc.(Raymond Perry),
owner of the Montrose Bay Health Care Center, alleging medical negligence in the care
of her husband. Mrs. West testified that she had been hospitalized during the same
period for cancer that she was unaware of the level of care that her husband was receiving
although she had complained of a foul order in his room.
Low Reprehensibility: Other evidence at trial included records from the nursing
home. A monthly data sheet indicated when Mr. West was turned and when he was fed.
Some of the dates were clearly in error, indicating that Mr. West was cared for on days
when he was not in the care of the nursing home. Apparently, the nursing staff did not
keep clear records and mistakenly indicated that Mr. West had been cared for when he
was not.
High Reprehensibility: Other evidence at trial included records from the nursing
home. A monthly data sheet indicated when Mr. West was turned and when he was fed.
Many of the dates were clearly in error, indicating that Mr. West was cared for on days
when he was not in the care of the nursing home. There was strong evidence that the
nursing staff routinely falsified records, indicating that they cared for Mr. West when
they did not. Testimony revealed that this problem had been reported to management on
numerous occasions, but no action was ever taken to ensure that the nurses did not falsify
the records. The nursing home staff failed to evaluate and treat Mr. West's bedsores.
Nursing home records also indicated that the facility was short-staffed, well below
federal guidelines. In addition, a nurse and ex-employee of the nursing home provided
evidence of other nurses smoking marijuana and sleeping on the job. According to this
witness, management had been alerted to these problems as well, but once again, had
done nothing to prevent the behavior. She also testified that patients were not helped to
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the bathroom nor were they catheterized so they often urinated and defecated in their bed
and were forced to lie in the excrement for up to two days.
Trial testimony also focused on the damages incurred by the Wests. Mrs. West's
attorneys submitted as evidence the following documents: medical bills from James
West's final hospital stay totaling $24,856 and a bill for nursing home care totaling

$28,650. The Wests' attorneys are also seeking $500,000 for pain and suffering.
Peri-Care (Mr. Perry) responded in the following manner:
Concession: Peri-Care (I) recognizes that Mr. West's injuries were a direct result

of the poor care he received at our facility and we are truly sorry for his suffering. Our
company (I) was horrified by the incident and immediately took precautions to ensure
that such incidents would not occur again at our facility. In addition, any employees
involved in falsification of records have been dismissed. We have instituted a frequent
evaluation system to ensure that our employees are performing their duties properly and
effectively. In addition, we perform regular random checks to ensure that patient charts
are completed truthfully and accurately.
Excuse: Peri-Care (I) is truly sorry for the injuries that Mr. West suffered while
in the care of my facility. The nurse who primarily cared for Mr. West had been working
double-shifts for the past three weeks due to the nursing shortage which apparently
interfered with her ability to care for her patients. Because her records were not accurate,
I was unable to detect that Mr. West was not receiving adequate care.

Justification: Peri-Care (I) is sorry that Mr. West's condition worsened during
his time at our facility. However, our staff recognized that Mr. West's health was
declining and Mr. West was transferred to the hospital before his condition got too
serious. It is not uncommon or especially serious for persons in Mr. West's condition to
develop such infections. As soon as Mr. West's condition was realized, we sent him to a
hospital where he could receive more immediate treatment.
Refusal: Peri-Care regrets Mr. West's condition, but maintains that our facility is
not responsible for his poor health. Our facility provides a high standard of care and
none of our patients are neglected. Mr. West was not well and unfortunately patients in
his condition are often plagued by problems of this type despite excellent care.
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The following excerpt provides information about a civil court case. Please read the
information carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Carl and Pearl Jeansonne v. Anderson Corporation (Robert Anderson)
Jeansonne v. Anderson Corporation (or Robert Anderson) is a lawsuit concerning
injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. Carl and Pearl Jeansonne claim
that Charles Landau, an employee of the Anderson Corporation (Robert Anderson) was
making a delivery for the company when he negligently caused an accident resulting in
injuries to Carl Jeansonne. Charles Landau, a driver for Anderson's Corporation (Mr.
Anderson), was operating a semi tractor truck that was attached to a large trailer loaded

with asphalt. Entering a highway construction site, Mr. Landau lost control of his tractortrailer, crossed two lanes of traffic, and crashed into the median. The front axle from his
truck became airborne and struck the front windshield of a truck being driven by the
plaintiff, Carl Jeansonne. Mr. Jeansonne was injured. The roadway was clear and dry.
Low Reprehensibility: Two witnesses stated that the plaintiff did not appear to
be violating the speed limit immediately before the accident. Both agreed that the driver
apparently lost control of his vehicle as he was entering the construction area. A review
of Mr. Landau's driving record revealed he has received one speeding ticket over the
previous 6 years, but has never been cited for any other traffic violations. Mr. Anderson
performed thorough checks before hiring Mr. Landau. In order to be employed by Mr.
Anderson, a driver must have 5 years driving experience with no accidents, no more than
two speeding tickets over the past 10 years, and must pass a drug screening. Each driver
is also required to complete several training courses before taking a truck off the
property.
High Reprehensibility: Two witnesses estimated that the plaintiff was driving
15-20 mph over the speed limit for the construction zone. An expert for the plaintiffs
stated that in his professional opinion, the tractor-trailer was traveling too fast for the
conditions and as a result, the driver lost control of his vehicle. In addition, the expert
testified that the driver did not use the proper braking technique which resulted in the
severity of the accident. A review of Mr. Landau's driving record revealed that over the
previous 6 years he has been convicted of 3 speed related offenses and a DUI. The
Anderson Corporation performed no checks of Mr. Landau's driving record before hiring
him and did not require any training or driving safety courses.
Low Injury Severity: Mr. Jeansonne sustained a concussion--a brief loss of
consciousness-as well as an injury to the cervical spine and a soft tissue injury to the
neck resulting in muscle spasms. He is fully mobile but complains of recurrent back and
neck pain. He missed a month and a half of work recovering from this injury. He
continues to receive massage therapy and chiropractic care and it is anticipated that he
may not be completely healed for another 6 months.
High Injury Severity: Mr. Jeansonne suffered multiple fractures of the skull and
contusions in the brain and was in a coma upon his arrival to the hospital. After several
weeks, he emerged from the coma, but remained bedridden, nonverbal, and mute. Mr.
Jeansonne continues to receive physical, occupational, and speech therapy. He remains
in state of very low functioning. It is anticipated he will remain totally dependent
throughout the remainder of his life.
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Under laws of vicarious liability, employers are responsible for any actions of
their employees during the time the employees are on duty. The law clearly states that if
an employee causes an accident while in the commission of work duties, the employer is
ultimately responsible for any damages as a result of that accident.
Attorneys for Mr. Jeansonne are requesting the following amounts in damages:
$32,517 in medical expenses, $230,000 in past and future lost wages, and $600,000 in
pain and suffering.
In response to the lawsuit brought by the Jeansonne's, the Anderson Corporation

(Mr. Anderson) has made the following statement:
Concession: Our company (I) understands that one of our employees cased an

accident resulting in injuries to Mr. Jeansonne. The Anderson Corporation (I) accepts
full responsibility for this horrible accident and we are truly sorry that this has occurred.
This incident has caused us to reevaluate and strengthen our already stringent safety
measures, so that this type of incident will not be repeated."
Excuse - I understand that my employee caused an accident resulting in injuries
to Mr. Jeansonne. I am truly sorry that such an incident occurred. However, the
construction zone in which the accident happened was not well marked and my driver
suddenly came upon an uneven patch of road. The road was wet and when he applied the
brakes, the truck began to skid. Despite his best attempts, he was unable to control the
truck and prevent the accident.
Justification - Our company (I) understands that our driver was involved in an
accident resulting in injuries to Mr. Jeansonne. However, our driver handled the truck
the best he could and the accident could have been much worse. There were several
other cars in the vicinity and our driver acted quickly to avoid a colliding with any other
cars.
Refusal - The Anderson Corporation (I) understands that Mr. Jeansonne has
suffered some serious injuries, but we are not responsible for those injuries. Our
company (I) holds it's drivers to the strictest safety regulations and has made every
attempt to prevent accidents. This accident occurred in an unsafe area and was
completely beyond our driver's control. Neither our driver nor our company was
negligent in any way.
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The following excerpt provides information about a civil court case. Please read the
information carefully and answer the questions that follow.
Herman v. Morgan Chemical Corporation.(Robert Morgan)
Morgan Chemical Corporation (Robert Morgan) hired Sandra Herman, age 34, as
an independent contractor to demonstrate and sell its products. While demonstrating SunClean, an all-purpose cleaner, Mrs. Herman suffered a coughing fit and developed a fever
and breathing problems. She consulted several doctors and an allergist. She underwent
several expensive treatments and was placed her on steroid- and cortisone-based drugs

that gradually improved her breathing but caused her to gain over 60 pounds. Later, her
doctors began to suspect a connection between her asthma and her work. Her doctors

learned that Sun-Clean contained a caustic, sodium hydroxide. Mrs. Herman was
diagnosed as suffering from "occupational asthma", meaning asthma caused by exposure
to chemicals in the workplace. At that time, Mrs. Herman ended her employment with
Morgan Chemical Corporation (Robert Morgan).
Low injury severity: She was advised that her symptoms would likely flare up
and that her condition would worsen when she was tired or feeling stressed. They
advised her to work no more than 20 hours per week at her new job.
High injury severity: She was advised that her condition would worsen as she
aged and that she would be required to have weekly respiratory therapy for the rest of her
life. In addition, it is likely that Mrs. Herman will develop lung cancer and emphysema
at a relatively early age. At this point, she has been advised to work no more than 20
hours per week at her new job. Within the next ten years, she will probably be
completely unable to work due to breathing difficulties.
Mrs. Herman and her husband filed a complaint against Morgan Chemical
(Robert Morgan) asserting that Morgan Chemical (he) was negligent in not providing
sufficient warnings about the dangers inherent in use of its product. During a two-day
training period, Sunshine instructed Mrs. Herman about the company's products and
personnel, but no part of the training concerned the potential hazards or safe use of the
products.
The Sun-Clean label stated: "SUN CLEAN is safe to use". In larger print, the
label stated that Sun-Clean "CONTAINS NO ACIDS, CAUSTICS, AMMONIA,
ALIPHATIC OR AROMATIC SOLVENTS". The label stated that Sun-Clean met the
"operating standards" of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). It
did not warn of the dangers of inhaling Sun-Clean vapors.
Low Reprehensibility: John Morgan designed the Sun-Clean label by copying
information from product labels of other manufacturers. A chemist employed by Mr.
Morgan had the responsibility to review the labels. He did not recommend any label
changes.
High Reprehensibility: John Morgan designed the Sun-Clean label by copying
information from product labels of other manufacturers. There was a "safety data sheet"
that outlined the hazardous ingredients in Sun-Clean, but Mr. Morgan ignored it. The
sheet indicated that Sun-Clean contained a caustic soda, but the Sun-Clean label stated
that the product contained no caustics. The data sheet also warned "Danger...Avoid

breathing vapor. Keep container closed. Use with adequate ventilation." The Sun-Clean
label, however, did not warn against breathing Sun-Clean vapors. Furthermore, Mr.
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Morgan did not submit either the label or the product to OSHA for approval, as required
by federal regulations. Nor did Mr. Morgan consult "OSHA operating standards" to
determine whether the product met those standards. Mr. Morgan simply copied the
OSHA label from another label and placed it on his in order to keep costs to a minimum.
A chemist employed by Mr. Morgan had the responsibility to review labels. He did not
recommend any label changes.
Mrs. Herman's attorneys are seeking $18,546 in past medical expenses, $20,000 for
future medical expenses, $5000 for lost wages, and $120,000 for future wage losses due

to the inability to work full-time. In addition, they are seeking $500,000 for pain and
suffering.
When presented with this case, Morgan Chemicals (Mr. Morgan) responded as
follows:
Concession: Our company (I) sincerely apologizes for the injuries suffered by
Mrs. Herman. It was our responsibility to ensure that our products contained the proper
safety labels and that our employees were instructed on the safe use of those products.

We realize that neglecting to meet those responsibilities resulted in harm to Mrs. Herman
and we are truly sorry. We have developed a new labeling procedure and are taking
extensive precautions to ensure that this incident is not repeated.
Excuse: I am truly sorry that Mrs. Herman became ill after demonstrating my

product. The chemist who is responsible for checking the safety label was going through
a difficult divorce. As a result, he was suffering from severe depression which required
hospitalization shortly after this product was labeled. The depression interfered with his
ability to think clearly, resulting in a mistake when reading the safety sheet. As a result,
the chemist failed to ensure the correct labeling of the product.
Justification: Our company truly regrets that Mrs. Herman became ill after
demonstrating our products. However, our company performed internal research which

showed that the chemicals in our products were not dangerous. Therefore, we did not
feel that there was any need to warn of possible dangers.
Refusal: Our company (I) does not feel that Mrs. Herman's illness is the fault of
our company, nor do we feel that we could have prevented her illness. We have
numerous other employees who demonstrate and none of them have reported any health
problems. We are sympathetic to Mrs. Herman, but we do not believe that her illness is
in any way related to our product or her employment with our company.
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Appendix B
Judge's Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your
decision. In a prior judicial hearing, the defendant (defendant's name) was determined to
be liable (at fault) for negligence in failing to adequately warn of the dangers associated
with use of its product, Sun-Clean. Therefore, you will not have to determine which
party was a fault. Your task will be to award damages to the plaintiff, (plaintiff's name).
Please consider, how you, as a juror, might decide this civil case. Of course, in a
real trial, you would have much more information. However, based just on the limited
information that you have received, please answer the following questions about the

lawsuit against (defendant).
The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by (plaintiff). The
Court's determination that the defendant was negligent should not influence your damage
award determinations.

It is now your responsibility to award (plaintiff) such sum as you find will fairly
and justly compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the
defendant's negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make (plaintiff) whole
again or return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be
used to punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of
(plaintiff's) needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life.
You may not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant.
a) medical expenses
b) loss of wages
(or consortium)
c)

(amount in numbers)

(amount in words)

(amount in numbers)

(amount in words)

(amount in numbers)

(amount in words)

pain and suffering

In addition to any damages which you find (plaintiff) entitled, you may, but are
not required to, award (plaintiff) an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it
is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct
in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those
damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter
and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the
defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the
plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff's needs or injuries.

Punitive Award

(amount in numbers)
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(amount in words)

Appendix C
Please respond to the following statements to the best of your ability by circling the

number that best reflects your opinion.
1. The plaintiff's life will never be the same as a result of this incident.
Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

2. The defendant truly regrets his behavior.
Strongly
Agree

3.

1

2

3

4

5

The defendant's behavior was reckless.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

4. The degree of pain and suffering on the part of the plaintiff was minimal.
Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

5. The defendant acted in this manner knowing that harm would occur.
Strongly
Agree

6.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

The necessary precautions to prevent this type of incident were taken.

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

7

8

9

Strongly

7. The defendant appears to regret his actions.
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

Agree

Disagree

8. A damage award will cause financial hardship for the defendant.
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

9. The plaintiff's injuries were not severe.
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

10. The defendant should have no difficulty paying an amount awarded against him.
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Agree

Strongly
Disagree

ii. The defendant accepted responsibility for his actions.
Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6
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7

8

9

Strongly
Disagree

Appendix D
Please answer the following demographic questions.
12. Sex:
Male
13. Race:
White/Non-Hispanic
Female

White/Hispanic

Hispanic/Black
14. Age:

18-29

50-59

30-39

Black

60+

Other

40-49

15. Marital Status:

1. never married
2. divorced
3. married

4. widow/ widower

16. Education Level

1. less than high school graduate
2. high school graduate
3. some college
4. college degree

5. post-graduate college work or degree
17. Employment Status:

3. Retired
4. Unemployed

1. Full-Time
2. Part-Time

18. Occupation:
19. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you evaluate your political views?
3. Somewhat conservative
4. Conservative

1. Liberal
2. Somewhat liberal

20. Please indicate your annual family income.
under $15,000
$45,001-$60,000

$15,001-$30,000
$60,001-$70,000

21. Have you ever served on a civil or criminal jury?
1.
Yes, Civil
2.
Yes, Criminal
3.

No, Never

22. Have you ever been a party in a lawsuit?
1.
2.
3.
4.

Yes, I have sued
Yes, I have been
Yes, I have both
No, I have never

someone
sued
sued someone and been sued
been involved
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$30,001-$45,000
Above $71,000

Appendix E
Table El
Mean Economic Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Defendant Status,

Defendant Reprehensibility, and Account Proffered

Defendant Reprehensibility

Account

Concessions

Defendant Status

Individual

Corporate

Excuses

Individual

Corporate

Justifications

Individual

Corporate

Refusals

Individual

Corporate

Low

High

M

85,295

100,946

SD

19,688

20,379

M

120,040

98,143

SD

19,378

20,037

M

125,276

93,423

SD

19,688

20,036

M

94,213

104,430

SD

20,431

19,688

M

91,536

157,384

SD

19,688

20,431

M

109,489

97,454

SD

19,688

20,037

M

115,282

82,724

SD

20,037

20,036

M

164,393

117,639

SD

18,991

20,037
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Table E2
Mean Pain and Suffering Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Defendant Status
and Account Proffered

Defendant Status

Account

Concessions

Individual

Corporate

382,631

433,385

38,463

38,136

436,161

375,080

37,806

38,513

394,671

389,835

SD

39,270

38,136

M

376,244

437,425

SD

38,136

37,542

M
SD

Excuses

M
SD

Justifications

Refusals

M
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Table E3
Mean Pain and Suffering Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Defendant Status,
Defendant Reprehensibility, and Account Proffered

Defendant Reprehensibility

Account

Concessions

Defendant Status

Individual

Corporate

Excuses

Individual

Corporate

Justifications

Individual

Corporate

Refusals

Individual

Corporate

Low

High

M

353,833

411,429

SD

53,932

54,854

423,341

443,428

SD

53,932

53,932

M

463,889

408,433

SD

52,994

53,932

M

312,327

437,833

SD

55,899

52,994

M

348,052

441,390

SD

53,932

57,094

M

393,385

386,286

SD

53,932

53,932

M

432,957

319,532

SD

53,932

53,932

M

392,894

481,956

SD

52,238

53,932

M
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Table E4
Mean Economic Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Defendant Status, Account
Proffered, and Negligence Stipulation

Negligence Stipulation

Defendant
Status

Account

Individual

Concession

Excuse

Corporate

Concession

Excuse

No Stipulation

Stipulation

M

65,680

87,777

SD

17,828

17,262

M

95,078

64,726

SD

17,828

17,828

M

135,488

70,818

SD

17,262

18,453

M

75,910

71,361

SD

19,150

17,828
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Table E5
Mean Pain and Sufferin Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Defendant Status
and Account Proffered

Defendant Status

Account

Concessions

Excuses

Individual

Corporate

206,198

389,964

SD

34,360

35,384

M

236,722

186,738

34,184

35,475

M

SD

Table E6
Mean Pain and Suffering Damage Awards (in dollars) as function of Defendant Status
and Negligence Stipulation

Negligence Stipulation

No Stipulation

Stipulation

M

235,833

207,087

SD

34,789

33,646

M

282,113

294,590

SD

36,058

34,789

Defendant
Status

Individual

Corporate
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Table E7
Mean Pain and Suffering Damage Awards (in dollars) as a function of Account Proffered
and Negligence Stipulation

Negligence Stipulation

Account

Concession

M
SD

Excuse

M
SD
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No Stipulation

Stipulation

317,286

278,877

35,384

34,260

200,660

222,800

35,475

34,184
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